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Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling has provided a number of important
insights about the interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax
system. In this paper, we emphasize that a labor market policy of recycling tax revenues
from an environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost depends on how the
costs of labor are modeled. We propose an approach, which combines neoclassical
substitutability and fixed factor proportions. Our concept implies a user cost of labor
which consists of the market price of labor plus the costs of inputs associated with the
employment of a worker. We present simulation results based on a CO2 tax and the recycling
of its revenues to reduce the non-wage labor cost. One simulation is based on the market
price of labor and the other on the user cost of labor. We found a double dividend under the
first approach but not under the second one.
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I. Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses have played over the last ten
years a key role in the evaluation of green tax reforms, the reorientation of the tax
system to concentrate taxes more on “bads” like pollution and less on “goods”
like labor input or capital formation. The ongoing concern about the magnitude of
distortionary taxation suggests the possibility of using environmental taxes to
replace existing factor and commodity taxes. A conjecture called the “double
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dividend hypothesis” points out that environmental taxes have two benefits: they
discourage environmental degradation and they raise revenue that could offset
other distortionary taxes.1 The non-environmental dividend can be defined in
various ways. Given the important unemployment problem in the EU, priority has
been given to the analysis of distortions in the labor market that might explain
persisting unemployment.2 The revenue from the pollution taxes is recycled to cut
labor taxes. On the one side, the narrow base of an energy tax constitutes an
inherent efficiency handicap. On the other side, the impact of the tax reform on pre-
existing inefficiencies in taxing labor could offset this handicap and a double
dividend arises. Therefore, in principle a double dividend can arise only if (i) the
pre-existing tax system is significantly inefficient on non-environmental grounds
and (ii) the revenue-neutral reform significantly reduces this prior inefficiency. The
double dividend actually arises only if the second condition operates with sufficient
force. However, it could also arise if the burden of the environmental tax falls
mainly on the undertaxed factor (e.g., immobile capital) and relieves the burden of
the overtaxed factor (i.e., labor).3 Since no existing tax systems are likely in a
second-best optimum, i.e., minimizing the sum of deadweight losses given a fixed
budget, the scope for a double dividend is always present.
Although CGE modeling has provided a number of important insights about
the interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax system,
much remains to be done to improve our understanding of market-based
environmental policy. One reason is that some CGE modelers affirm the double
dividend hypothesis while others could not find a double dividend outcome. The
specification of the labor market, for instance, could be crucial to the discussion
on the effect of environmental policy on employment. A labor market policy of
recycling tax revenues from an environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage
labor cost depends on how the labor market is modeled. The objective of our
analysis is not to show that non-competitive labor markets could provide a potential
channel for a double dividend outcome. A variety of approaches are discussed in
the literature to analyze the impacts of an ecological tax reform in the presence of
wage setting institutions and involuntary unemployment. Typically, labor market
1 For a state of the art review on the double dividend issue, see Goulder (1997) and Bovenberg
and Goulder (2001).
2 For theoretical papers on the double dividend issue, see Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg and
Goulder (1996). See Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1992), Proost and van Regemorter (1995) and
Welsch (1996) for empirical papers.
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imperfections are introduced by an upward sloping wage setting curve, which
replaces the labor supply curve used in the competitive model. The equilibrium
wage and employment level are now determined by the intersection of the wage
setting and the labor demand curve. The theory of equilibrium unemployment
offers three microeconomic models, which all capture specific institutional factors
of actually existing labor markets – namely trade union models, efficiency wage
models, and mismatch models. Each model is appropriate to describe a specific
part of the multi-facetted phenomenon of involuntary unemployment. So, unlike
the recent double dividend literature, we will not emphasize the empirical relevance
of a certain labor market model, but our aim is instead to attack the way the costs
of labor are conceived in all neoclassical models.
The objective of this paper therefore is to advocate an approach where the
cost of labor is not just wage per day, but the cost of the working place per day,
including the wage. This new concept is that of the “user cost of labor”, for which,
the cost of an additional worker includes not just salary, but also the costs of
inputs tied to the worker (e.g., office equipment, electricity, material, etc.).
Such a view will have a reduced impact on substitution possibilities between
labor and other inputs and hence will affect the outcome of a double dividend
policy in a different way than under the traditional approach of pure market prices.
We will use an approach proposed by Conrad (1983) who combines the approaches
to neoclassical substitutability and fixed factor proportions. This cost-price
approach uses Leontief partially fixed factor proportions to identify both a
disposable or variable part and a bound or fixed portion of each input. The true
cost, or cost price, of any input consists of its own price plus the costs associated
with the portion of that input bound to other inputs. Within the cost-price framework,
the demand for an input can be separated into a committed component linked to
the use of other inputs, and a disposable component that is free for substitution.
At one extreme, when the disposable quantities of all inputs equal zero, no factor
substitution is possible and the cost-price approach reduces to the Leontief fixed-
proportion case. At the other extreme, when the committed quantities of all inputs
are zero, the neoclassical model is relevant and the cost-price of any input equates
the market price.
We include this user-cost approach in CGE modeling and then run a model to
check its relevance and to understand the effects of imperfect substitution in the
labor market.4 We econometrically estimate cost share equations in cost-prices
4  In Section V we relate our result to the findings in the theoretical and empirical literature on
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and then use cost prices as well as market prices to investigate the double dividend
hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the cost-price
approach and in Section III the parameter estimates for a restricted version of the
manufacturing industry. In Section IV, we briefly outline our CGE model. In Section
V, we present our simulation results based on a CO2 tax and the recycling of its
revenues to reduce the non-wage labor cost. One simulation will be based on
market prices and the other one on cost prices. Our objective is to compare the
results in the light of the conjecture of a double dividend. The conclusion from our
result is summarized in Section VI.
II. Conditioned input demand and cost share equations in cost-prices
In contrast to Leontief production functions, we assume that only fractions of
the input quantities are related to each other in fixed factor proportions and that
therefore, in contrast to the neoclassical theory, only fractions of the input quantities
are disposable for substitutions. With capital, labor and energy as inputs, we
regard a truck, a truck driver and the minimal possible fuel consumption as bound
inputs. In general, however, not the total quantity of an input is bound by other
inputs with fixed proportions, but a fraction is unbound and disposable for
substitution. It is this fraction which is relevant for a reallocation of inputs if
relative factor prices change. If the energy price increases, the maintenance of the
machinery will be improved (an additional worker), and truck drivers will drive
slower (working overtime or less mileage per day). However, this substitution
effect can primarily be observed with respect to the unbound component of an
input. Bound factors like machinery, the stock of trucks, or truck drivers are not
objects of a substitution decision; they will be replaced either simultaneously or
not at all as one more unit is linked to high costs due to bound inputs (an additional
truck requires an additional truck driver). In case of a higher energy price, therefore,
the disposable energy input will be the one that will be reduced. The fact that other
inputs are bound to energy should be indicated by a cost-price or user cost in
which the price of energy enters with an appropriate weight. In order to take into
account this aspect, we separate the quantity of an input (vi) into a bound part and
into an unbound one:5
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where  i v  is  the  number  of  units  of  factor  i  bound  by  the  usage of the remaining
n - 1 inputs, and  i v ˆ is the disposable quantity of factor i. The bound quantity of an
input,  , i v  depends with fixed factor proportions upon the disposable quantities of
the other inputs. Here,  i v is a simple sum, defined as
where aij is the quantity of vi  bound to one disposable unit of vj . Substituting (2)
into (1) yields
                        where aii  = 1
by definition. If the disposable part of input j is increased by one unit, this increases
the total quantity of input j by just this unit and all other inputs i (i = 1,..., n, i ¹ j)
by the quantities aij. These aij coefficients constitute a matrix A  = (aij) that describes
the degree of affiliation for any data set. If aij  = 0 (i ¹  j) for all i and j, the
neoclassical  model  is relevant and the cost-price of any input is its own price. If
i v ˆ  = 0 (or vi =  ) i v for all i, no factor substitution is possible and the cost price
approach reduces to the Leontief fixed proportion production function.
We next replace the quantities vi in the cost minimizing approach by the
partitioning given in (3). Instead of
where x is the given output quantity and Pi is the price for i, we write
where
                             and  ajj = 1,            j = 1,…n
is the cost-price of input j. It consists of its own price (Pj) plus the additional costs
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associated with factors bound to vj. By substituting the cost-minimizing factor
demand functions  ) ˆ ,..., ˆ ; ( ˆ 1 n j j P P x f v = into (3) we obtain the cost-minimizing input
quantities in terms of cost prices  1 ˆ P ,...  . ˆ
n P The dual cost function with respect to
the cost prices is then:
The analogue to Shephard’s lemma holds:
Equations (8) and (9) provide the disposable amounts of each input as well as
the cost minimizing quantities of total inputs. From Equation (9), we can determine
the cost shares (wi) of each factor as follows:
These share equations can then be used to empirically estimate the parameters
of the cost prices.6 In the next Section, we will estimate econometrically the cost-
price model.7
III. Empirical results for a Cobb-Douglas cost function
As a specification of the cost function we will choose the simplest case,
namely a cost function of the Cobb-Douglas type (henceforth, CD). However, an
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6 Technical change can be introduced into the cost prices (see Olson and Shieh 1989). We have
omitted this aspect in our CGE analysis.
7  The cost-price concept has been employed econometrically within a model of consumer
behaviour by Conrad and Schröder (1991). They use a specification of an expenditure function
in durables and non-durables and identify the part of goods complementary to consumer265  RECYCLING OF ECO-TAXES, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS
durables like gasoline, electricity or repair services. In the GEM-E3 model for the EU (Capros
et al. 1996) the demand for durables takes into account the demand for complementary goods
bound to consumer durables.
8 We are indebted to Henrike Koschel and Martin Falk for providing us with the data set. For
more details see Koschel (2001) and Koebel et al. (2003).
approach with cost prices and committed inputs does not result in simple
measures of the degree of substitutability as in the conventional CD case where
the elasticity of substitution is unity and all inputs are price substitutes. As shown
in Conrad (1983), even under the CD-assumption, variable elasticities of
substitution and complementary relations are possible. Under our assumption of
constant returns to scale and disembodied factor augmenting technical change,
bj.t, the CD-cost function is  , ˆ ln ) . ( ln ) ˆ ; ( ln 0 j
j
j j P t b x P x C å + + + = g a where
å =
j
j 1 g and  . 0 = å
j
j b Because of (10),
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We have nested the inputs of a sector, based on an input-output table with 49
sectors, such that in the first stage the inputs for the CD-production function are
capital K, labor L, electricity E, material M, and fossil fuel F. As data for disaggregated
energy inputs are available only for a short period of time (1978-90), we are
constrained to a pooled time-series cross-section approach.8 A total of 49 sectors
for which data are available in the German national account statistics are pooled
into four sector aggregates: the energy supply sectors aggregate; the energy-
intensive manufacturing sectors aggregate; the non-energy-intensive
manufacturing sectors aggregate; the service sectors aggregate.
The five-equation system, consisting of the five cost-share equations for K, L,
E, M, F, is estimated for each of the four sector aggregates, employing the panel
data set in yearly prices and cost shares. It is assumed that the cost prices are
identical in each sector aggregate (i.e., sectoral dummy variables are added only to
the coefficients gi in (11)).
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have simplified our approach by concentrating on the cost-price of labor. Hence,
the composition (3) is reduced to
where  i = 1, 2, 3, 4  for  the  four  sector  aggregates.  The  cost-prices  for  K, E, F,
M are therefore market prices, i.e. , ˆ
, , i K i K P P = , ˆ
, , i E i E P P = i M i M P P , , ˆ = and
. ˆ
, , i F i F P P = The cost-price of labor is:
As mentioned before, aiL, i = K, E, M, F are the same for each sector aggregate
and so are the technical progress parameters bi, i = K, L, E, M, F. The system of
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with  L P ˆ as given in (13). In addition to using nonlinear techniques, the cost price
model must be estimated with non-negativity constraints imposed on the parameters
aiL, i = K, E, M, F. Table 1 presents the estimated parameters.
The  bias  of  technical  change is capital, electricity and material using (bk > 0,
bE > 0, bM > 0), and labor and fossil fuel saving (bL < 0, bF < 0). The cost price of
labor (13) for the industry with the dummy variable of zero is
, ˆ ˆ . i i KL i K L K + =a , ˆ
i i L L = , ˆ ˆ . i i EL i E L E + =a , ˆ ˆ . i i ML i M L M + =a
i i FL i F L F ˆ ˆ . + =a
(12)
i M ML i F FL i E EL i K KL i L i L P P P P P P , , , , , , . . . . ˆ a a a a + + + + = (13)
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Table 1. Maximum likelihood estimates for parameters of cost-prices and technical
change
     Dummy for factors       Parameters of technical progress     Parameters of costs prices
gK 0.092 (17.173) bK 8.5 10-4 (0,935) aKL 0.002 (0,431)
gL 0.458 (11.340) bL -0.005 (-1,824) aEL 0.055 (2,611)
gE 4·10-8 (6·10-6) bE 4.2 10-4 (1,889) aFL 0.072 (2,993)
gF 0.048 (3.508) bF -0.002 (-1,143) aML 0.422 (3,128)
gM
* 0.402 –––– bM* 0.006 ––––
Log Likelihood = 3540.189, Observations: 637
Notes: Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. *As the error terms add to zero, they are stochastically
dependent and we have omitted equation (17)  for estimation.
Using the aiL parameter estimates in Table 1, we conclude from (12) that an
additional unit of labor needs 0.002 units of capital, 0.055 units of electricity, 0.422
units of material and 0.072 units of fossil fuel. In other words, reducing labor input
by one unit will release 0.002 units of capital, 0.055 units of electricity, 0.422 units
of material and 0.072 units of fossil fuel for possibilities of substitution as the
disposable components  F M E K ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ increase with the reduction of L  ). ˆ ( L =  In the
next Section we will use committed inputs, disposable inputs, and the corresponding
cost-price of labor within the framework of a CGE model to investigate their impact
on the outcome of the double dividend conjecture.
IV. The features of the CGE model
This Section presents the main characteristics of a comparative-static multi-
sector model for the German economy designed for the medium-run economic
analysis of carbon abatement constraints. Here, the concrete specification of the
model covers seven sectors and two primary factors.9  The choice of production
sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement, such
. . 072 . 0 422 . 0 . 055 . 0 . 002 . 0 ˆ
F M E K L L P P P P P P + + + + = (19)
9 The overall sectors are still the sectors F, E, M and the primary factors K and L. However, F
and M will be disaggregated to Fi  and Mi, i = 1,2,3  (see Table 2). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 268
as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across energy
goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The energy goods identified in the
model are coal (COL), natural gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil products (OIL)
and electricity (ELE). Non-energy production consists of an aggregate energy-
intensive sector (EIS) and the rest of production (OTH). Primary factors include
labor and capital, which are both assumed to be intersectorally mobile. Table 2
summarizes the sectors and primary factors incorporated in the model.
Table 2.  Overview of sectors and factors
                                          Sectors          Primary factors
1 COL Coal CAP Capital - K
2 OIL Refined oil products LAB Labor   - L
3 GAS Natural gas
4 ELE Electricity                            - E
5 CRU Crude oil
6 EIS Energy-intensive sectors




The model is a well-known Arrow-Debreu model that concerns the interaction
of consumers and producers in markets. Market demands are the sum of final and
intermediate demands. Final demand for goods and services is derived from the
utility maximization of a representative household subject to a budget constraint.
In our comparative-static framework, overall investment demand is fixed at the
reference level. The consumer is endowed with the supply of the primary factors of
production (labor and capital) and tax revenues (including CO2 taxes). Household
preferences are characterized by an aggregate, hierarchical (nested) constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. It is given as a CES composite of an
energy aggregate and a non-energy consumption composite. Substitution patterns
within the energy aggregate and the non-energy consumption bundle are reflected
via Cobb-Douglas functions. Producers choose input and output quantities in
order to maximize profits. The structure in production is nested. At the top level,
we have the KLEMF-structure with the CD specification in cost-prices. At the
second level, a CES function describes the substitution possibilities between the
material components. The primary energy composite is defined as a CES function
of coal, oil and natural gas. Key substitution elasticities are given in the Appendix.269  RECYCLING OF ECO-TAXES, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including
public investment) which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices.
In order to capture the implications of an environmental tax reform on the efficiency
of public fund raising, the model incorporates the main features of the German tax
system: income taxes including social insurance contributions, capital taxes
(corporate and trade taxes), value-added taxes, and other indirect taxes (e.g. mineral
oil tax).
All commodities are traded internationally. We adopt the Armington (1969)
assumption that goods produced in different regions are qualitatively distinct for
all commodities. There is imperfect transformability (between exports and domestic
sales of domestic output) and imperfect substitutability (between imports and
domestically sold domestic output). On the output side, two types of differentiated
goods are produced as joint products for sale in the domestic markets and the
export markets respectively. The allocation of output between domestic sales and
international sales is characterized by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
function. Intermediate and final demands are (nested CES) Armington composites
of domestic and imported varieties. Germany is assumed to be a price-taker with
respect to the rest of the world (ROW), which is not explicitly represented as a
region in the model. Trade with ROW is incorporated via perfectly elastic ROW
import-supply and export-demand functions. There is an imposed balance-of-
payment constraint to ensure trade balance between Germany and the ROW. That
is, the value of imports from ROW to Germany must equal the value of exports to
ROW after including a constant benchmark trade surplus (deficit).
The analysis of the employment effects associated with an environmental tax
reform requires the specification of unemployment. In our formulation, we assume
that unemployment is caused by a rigid and too high consumer wage (see, for
example, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1996).
For each input structure of the industries, we choose the KLEMF-model at the
top level. We employ in the cost share equations and in the cost price of labor the
parameters, estimated from another source of input-output tables. Since the cost
shares within the six industries differ from the cost shares calculated in the
econometric part, we have to calibrate one parameter per cost share in order to adjust
the estimated cost shares to the observed ones in the 7-industry base year table.
Therefore,  gLi (i = 1, ..., 7)  follows  from  (14),  given  the  cost  shares of the 7-industry
table. If  gLi  is determined, gKi, gEi, gFi and  gMi can be calculated from (15) - (18).
Allen elasticities (sij) for the Cobb-Douglas function in cost prices for each
sector can be calculated.10  They are related to the price elasticities of demand for
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factors of production (eij) according to eij =  sij .wj,  i, j = K, L, E, F, M. Table A2 in
the Appendix presents Allen elasticities and price elasticities of demand in the
CGE model with the parameter estimates of the cost-price model. Capital is a
substitute for all inputs with an elasticity of substitution close to one. Electricity
and fossil fuel have a complementary relationship to labor; material is a substitute
for labor, for electricity and for fossil fuel; electricity and fossil fuel are complements
in the non-energy intensive industries (OTH).
The disposable quantities of each factor of production can be derived from
equation (12). The disposable quantity of material, for instance, is
, . ˆ
i ML i L M M a - = i = 1,2,...,7.
From Table 3 we observe that in the non-energy-intensive industries (OTH) 82
percent of electricity is bound to labor, whereas in the energy intensive industries
(EIS) only 16 percent are bound to labor (i.e., up to 84 percent are disposable for
substitution). This part could be partly linked to capital (if aEK >0) and/or to material
(if aEM>0), which we have not looked into because we concentrated only on the
part of each input bound to labor. For materials, 13% of this input in the sector
OTH is bound to labor and 87 percent is free for substitution. In the industry EIS
only 6 percent is linked to labor and 94 percent is substitutable. Similarly as for
electricity, a high percentage of fossil fuel (96 percent) is linked to labor in the
industry OTH and only 22 percent in the energy intensive industry EIS. In this
industry, about 80 percent of fossil fuel is a candidate for substitution, whereas in
other industries (OTH) only 4 percent is such a candidate. The 80 percent of fossil
fuel which are not bound to labor could be bound to capital, to electricity, to
material or are substitutable in the conventional sense.
Table 3. Disposable and bounded fraction of each factor of production in CGE
model
                           Disposable                                          Bound (to labor)
OTH EIS OTH EIS
 K 0.999 0.999 0.001 0.001
 L1 1 0 0
 E 0.185 0.841 0.815 0.159
 M 0.868 0.937 0.132 0.063
 F 0.040 0.784 0.960 0.216271  RECYCLING OF ECO-TAXES, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS
Under constant returns to scale and price-taking behavior, the price of an
industry j, Pj, is equal to its unit cost:  ). , , , ˆ , ( , , , j F j M E j L K j j P P P P P c P =
Written in logarithmic terms, using our CD specification in cost-prices, we
obtain
In addition, we have unit cost functions of the CES type for material,
), , , ( 7 6 5 , P P P f P j j M =  j = 1, 2, ...7,  and  for  fossil  fuel,   ), , , ( 3 2 1 , P P P f P j j F =
j = 1,2,...7. In order to solve the price system P1 ,…, P7, we have to add the labor-
cost price equations (13), where PL,j = PL for all j. If the price system has been
solved, next price dependent input-output coefficients as derived input demand
functions can be determined and the sectoral output levels can finally be
calculated. A detailed description of the model is available from the authors upon
request. The main data source underlying the model is the GTAP version 4
database, which represents global production and trade data for 45 countries and
regions, 50 commodities and 5 primary factors (McDougall et al. 1998). In addition,
we use OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for 1995. Reconciliation of these
data sources yields the benchmark data of our model.
V. Empirical results
In our simulation, we distinguish two types of scenarios. In each simulation,
carbon taxes are levied in order to meet a 21 percent reduction of domestic carbon
dioxide emissions as compared to 1990 emission levels. This is the reduction target
the German government has committed itself to in the EU Burden Sharing Agreement
adopted at the environmental Council meeting by Member States on June 1998.
One type of simulation is based on the market price of labor and the second type
on the cost price of labor. We impose revenue-neutrality in the sense that the level
of public provision is fixed. Subject to this equal-yield constraint, we consider two
ways to recycle the CO2 tax revenue for each type of simulation. One way is to
recycle it by a lump-sum transfer (LS) to the representative household. The other
way is to adopt an environmental tax reform (ETR) in view of the adverse
employment effects of carbon emission constraints. In such a case, the tax revenue
is used to lower the non-wage labor costs (social insurance payment). Table 4
ln ) . ( ˆ ln ) . ( ln ) . ( ln , P t P t P t P E E j E j L L j L K K j K j b g b g b g + + + + + =
) , , ( ln ) . ( 7 6 5 , P P P P t j M M j M b g + + ). , , ( ln ) . ( 3 2 1 , P P P P t j F F j F b g + + JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 272
summarizes the implications of the two types of simulation studies under two
ways of recycling the tax revenues. If firms decide on production and substitution
on the base of the market price of labor and the tax revenue is recycled by a lump-
sum transfer, then employment rate will be lower by 0.15 percent (see column 1 in
Table 4). Welfare, expressed here as a change in GDP, will be lower by 0.55 percent.
The CO2 tax rate at the 21 percent CO2 reduction level (marginal abatement cost) is
13.9 US$ per ton. Production in all industries declines, succeeding by a lower
demand for labor. If the tax revenue is used to lower non-wage labor costs, we
obtain an employment dividend because employment increases by 0.43 percent.
Since GDP does not increase(–0.38 percent), we do not obtain a “strong double
dividend” where the level of emissions is reduced and employment as well as GDP
are increased from the tax reform by itself. The positive substitution effect on labor
from the ETR outweighs the negative output effect on labor. For the producer, the
price of labor is lower by 0.72 percent compared to the policy of a lump-sum
transfer (last rows in Table 4). The prices PF of fossil fuel have increased by the
CO2 tax, and this increase differs by industry according to the size and composition
of this input.
The results under the user cost (cost-price) concept of labor can be explained
best by comparing the change of the market price of labor with the change of the
user cost of labor after the ETR. From the producer’s point of view, the price of
labor declined by 0.72 percent after the ETR but only by about 0.59 percent under
the user cost concept. As the second half of Table 4 shows, the cost-price of labor
differs by industry because the price aggregates PM and PF in (19) differ by
industry.11 Since direct wage costs are only about two-thirds of the user cost of
labor, the reduction in the cost of labor from the cut in social insurance payments
is smaller under the cost-price concept. Hence, the substitution effect on labor is
weaker and is outweighed by the negative output effect from higher energy prices
(lower GDP). Therefore, we do not obtain a double dividend under the cost-price
concept. The higher price  L P ˆ from (19) (about 1.55) is not the reason for this result,
because this figure is taken into account when calibrating the parameters. The
crucial impact comes from the aspect that a higher price of energy also raises the
cost-price of labor because workers need energy in order to be productive.
Therefore, employment declines more under the cost-price approach than under
the market price approach (–0.55 versus –0.15 percent). When the tax revenue is
11 The cost-price approach has not been adopted for the industries coal, crude oil, and gas.273  RECYCLING OF ECO-TAXES, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS
Table 4. Empirical results of tax reforms
                                                Market price of labor                         User cost of labor
LS ETR LS ETR
Employment –0.15 0.43 –0.55 –0.06
Consumption –0.47 –0.14 –0.38 –0.02
Carbon tax* 13.92 14.24 14.54 14.92
GDP –0.55 –0.38 –0.43 –0.22
PL (producer cost) 1 0.9928 1 0.9927
PL  (consumer wage) 1 1 1 1
PK 0.9992 0.9977 1.0005 0.9993
PE 1.0355 1.0310 1.0246 1.0199
PF – prices in the corresponding industries
  OTH 1.0632 1.0606 1.0650 1.0625
   EIS 1.0949 1.0929 1.0982 1.0964
   ELE 1.3708 1.3743 1.3869 1.3919
PM – prices in the corresponding industries
  OTH 1.0031 0.9997 1.0022 0.9986
   EIS 1.0057 1.0023 1.0045 1.0009
   OIL 1.0032 0.9999 1.0023 0.9988
Cost prices –  L P ˆ in the corresponding industries
  OTH 1.5582 1.5490
   EIS 1.5616 1.5524
   COL 1 0.9927
   OIL 1.4251 1.4164
   CRU 1 0.9927
   GAS 1 0.9927
   ELE 1.1016 1.0947
% change of  L P ˆ in the corresponding industries
  OTH –0.5936
   EIS –0.5898
   COL –0.7275
   OIL –0.6147
   CRU –0.7275
   GAS –0.7275
   ELE –0.6291
Notes: * In US$ (all other figures are percentage values or price indices). LS stands for Lump-
Sum Transfer, ETR for Environmental Tax Reform. A breakdown by sector of results on labor
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recycled, the firm perceives a reduction of the cost-price by 0.59 percent on the
average, which is too small to induce a substitution process high enough to yield
a double dividend. Although the decline in GDP is less under the cost-price
approach than under the market price approach (–0.22 versus –0.38 percent), the
incentive for substitution is weaker under the cost price approach and therefore
employment declines (–0.06 versus 0.43 percent).
VI. Conclusions
In our analytical and empirical analysis of a double dividend policy we
emphasized that a labor market policy of recycling tax revenues from an
environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost depends on how the
costs of labor are modeled. We proposed an approach that consists of the market
price of labor plus the costs of inputs associated with the employment of a worker.
We presented one simulation based on the market price of labor and another one
based on our user cost of labor concept. We found a double dividend under the
first approach but not under the second one.
Our final results are in principle the same obtained by Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) and Bovenberg and Van de Ploeg (1994) theoretically or by Bovenberg and
Goulder (1996) empirically using a CGE model for the US. Our initial results, however,
are not the same because they do not reject the employment dividend. The result
in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), that pollution taxes reduce the incentive to
supply labor, is not in contradiction to our initial result (a labor dividend) because
their proof is based on the assumption of a single input (labor). In Bovenberg and
Van de Ploeg (1994), three inputs are used (L, F and K), prices of capital and fossil
fuel, however, are determined on global competitive markets, i.e., they are
exogenous. In their factor price frontier a given tax on fossil fuel uniquely determines
the producer wage. Hence, the energy tax is fully born by the immobile factor labor
and thus amounts to an implicit labor tax. In the factor price frontier of our model,
derived from the unit cost function, prices of capital, material and of energy are
endogenous. The carbon tax is therefore not an implicit labor tax, i.e., the effect of
a lower tax on wages is not fully offset by the carbon tax. Another reason for
rejecting the labor dividend is how the range of pre-existing taxes and transfers is
included in the model. In contrast to the assumption of, e.g., Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994), the pre-existing tax system in our model is not optimal. Hence, one
could argue that a tax reform could enable efficiency gains, which are not linked
solely to a new environmental tax but to a general change in (effective) factor tax275  RECYCLING OF ECO-TAXES, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS
rates.12 But, this is still in line with the findings of Bovenberg and Goulder (1996),
who show that both, the analytical and the empirical analysis, coincide even if one
considers pre-existing taxes. While they find analytically that the prospects of a
double dividend are enhanced if “… a revenue neutral tax reform shifts the burden
of taxation to the less efficient (undertaxed) factor …”, there is no empirical evidence
obtaining such a situation in their numerical analysis. We obtain such a situation,
however, in our initial model, but our findings are at the end compatible with those
of others. The reason is that labor bears some cost of the energy tax because labor
and energy are partly bound in producing output. And, in addition, hiring labor
because of substitution, or, because of lower marginal cost of production adds
more to the cost of production than only the monthly wage bill for an additional
worker.
Policy makers are used to an economist’s advice that the outcome of a policy is
ambiguous and depends on assumptions made. However, we think that our point
that user costs of labor matter more than the normal wage costs is intuitively
attractive when arguing about the double dividend hypothesis.
Appendix
12 Goulder (1995).
Table A1. Key substitution elasticities
Description Value
Substitution elasticities in production
sM Material vs. material (within material inputs) 0.5
sF Fossil fuel vs. fossil fuel (within fossil fuel inputs) 0.3
Substitution elasticities in private demand
sC Energy goods vs. non-energy goods 0.8
Substitution elasticities in government demand
sG Fossil fuel vs. fossil fuel (within fossil fuel inputs) 0.8
Elasticities in international trade (Armington)
sA Substitution elasticity between imports vs. domestic inputs 4.0
e Transformation elasticity domestic vs. export 4.0 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 276
Allen elasticities of substitution for the Cobb-Douglas function in cost prices
in the CGE model for each sector are given by
                                                                    i, j, k = K,L,E,F,M.
The price elasticities of demand for factors of production (eij) are eij = sij wj.
Table A2 presents these elasticities.
Table A2. Allen elasticities of substitution and price elasticities of demand
 Sector OTH EIS Sector OTH EIS
sKL 0.996 0.993 eKF 0.011 0.032
sKE 0.997 0.999 eLK 0.333 0.185
sKM 0.999 0.999 eLE -0.024 0.0003
sKF 0.996 0.998 eLM 0.217 0.375
sLE -2.181 0.009 eLF -0.035 -0.014
sLM 0.444 0.580 eEK 0.334 0.187
sLF -3.035 -0.432 eEL -0.334 0.001
sEM 0.579 0.937 eEM 0.283 0.607
sEF -2.053 0.786 eEF -0.024 0.025
sMF 0.466 0.909 eMK 0.335 0.187
eKK -0.664 -0.812 eML 0.068 0.056
eLL -0.491 -0.547 eME 0.006 0.034
eEE -0.259 -0.820 eMF 0.005 0.029
eMM -0.414 -0.306 eFK 0.333 0.186
eFF -0.073 -0.761 eFL -0.465 -0.042
eKL 0.153 0.097 eFE -0.023 0.028
eKE 0.011 0.036 eFM 0.228 0.589
eKM 0.489 0.647
Note: The calibrated parameters are gL,EIS = 0.151 and gL,OTH = 0.238. The benchmark value
shares for Germany are wK,EIS = 0.187, wL,EIS = 0.097, wE,EIS = 0.036, wM,EIS = 0.648, wF,EIS = 0.032,
wK,OTH = 0.335, wI,OTH = 0.153, wE,OTH = 0.011, wM,OTH = 0.489 and wF,OTH = 0.011.
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